rebar

Paste it into your assistant. It asks for the manifest, the server wiring and the skills, and for an honest account of what this record does not say. Read that second file first.

Draft an Agent Plugin (agent-plugins.org, specification 1.1.0) that wraps the
MCP server described below, so that somebody could install one thing and have
an assistant that knows when and how to use it.

An Agent Plugin is one installable unit: a `plugin.json` manifest, an
`mcp.json` that wires up the servers it needs, and a `skills/` directory
where each skill is a folder holding a `SKILL.md`. Hand back every file in
full, each under its own path, ready to save.

1. Write `plugin.json` with `$schema` exactly `https://agent-plugins.org/schemas/1.1.0/plugin.schema.json`. The name is
   1 to 64 characters of a-z, 0-9, `-` and `.`, alphanumeric at both ends, with
   no `--` and no `..` in it.

2. Write `mcp.json` wiring THIS server exactly as its record declares it. A
   remote keeps the URL and the transport type as written. A package keeps the
   registry, the identifier and the version as written. Do not invent a command,
   a port, a flag or an argument that is not in the record.

3. Every secret stays an input. No key, token, password or connection string
   belongs in either file. Declare what has to be supplied, name it, and say what
   it is for.

4. Do not invent tools. The record lists the tools it lists, and if it lists
   none then the honest plugin says the tool list was not published rather than
   guessing one from the description.

5. Skills are jobs, not tools. Write one skill per thing somebody would actually
   ask for, and inside each one say when to reach for this server, what a good
   result looks like, and what to do when it comes back empty. A skill per tool
   is a manual page with a different filename.

6. Say where it stops. Name what this plugin will not do — what it has no tool
   for, what needs a person, and what it must not be pointed at. A plugin with no
   stated edge reads as one with no edge.

7. Keep the author's own words for the description. If you would rather say it
   differently, say yours somewhere else and leave theirs where it is.

8. Record which version of the server you wrapped, and where the record came
   from, at the top of `plugin.json`'s description or in the readme. A plugin
   nobody can trace back to a version is one nobody can update.

Produce a second file alongside them, `LIMITS.md`, and treat it as the more
important of the two. The plugin is for whoever installs it. This is for
whoever has to decide whether installing it is a good idea, and that is
usually a different person who will never read the manifest.

It has three parts.

**What this is built from.** One paragraph: whose server it is, what the
record says it does, which version, and the fact that the record is all you
had. Say plainly that nobody ran it.

**What the record does not say.** One entry per gap. Whether the tool list was
published. What the server does with what it reads. What it costs. Whether it
writes anything anywhere. What credentials it will ask for and what those
credentials can reach. An unanswered question stays an unanswered question:
do not fill one in from the description or from what similar servers usually do.

**What a person has to check before trusting it.** The specific things
somebody should verify for themselves, in the order that would stop them
soonest if the answer is bad.

Write it in plain English, and do not soften it. A plugin drafted from a
directory record is a starting point to argue with, not something to install
into anything that matters.

The server record follows, exactly as the public index holds it. It is
everything I have: nobody has run this server, called a tool on it, or checked
that the address answers.

```json
{
  "server": {
    "$schema": "https://static.modelcontextprotocol.io/schemas/2025-09-29/server.schema.json",
    "name": "io.github.navapbc/rebar",
    "description": "Event-sourced ticket system with a Jira reconciler, exposed as an MCP server.",
    "repository": {
      "url": "https://github.com/navapbc/rebar",
      "source": "github"
    },
    "version": "0.12.0",
    "packages": [
      {
        "registryType": "pypi",
        "registryBaseUrl": "https://pypi.org",
        "identifier": "nava-rebar",
        "version": "0.12.0",
        "runtimeHint": "uvx",
        "transport": {
          "type": "stdio"
        },
        "environmentVariables": [
          {
            "description": "Path to the repo root that holds the .tickets-tracker store (defaults to the git toplevel of the working dir).",
            "name": "REBAR_ROOT"
          },
          {
            "description": "Set to 1 to expose only the read tools (no write/mutation tools).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_READONLY"
          },
          {
            "description": "Set to 1 to enable the billable LLM tools (review_code / scan_spec / verify_completion / review_plan); off by default.",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_ALLOW_LLM"
          },
          {
            "description": "Set to 1 to allow the live (mutating) Jira reconcile mode; otherwise reconcile is dry-run only.",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_ALLOW_JIRA_SYNC"
          },
          {
            "description": "Transport for the MCP server: 'stdio' (default) or 'http' (the optional Streamable-HTTP transport).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_TRANSPORT"
          },
          {
            "description": "Bind host for the Streamable-HTTP transport (default 127.0.0.1).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_HTTP_HOST"
          },
          {
            "description": "Bind port for the Streamable-HTTP transport (1-65535; default 8000).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_HTTP_PORT"
          },
          {
            "description": "URL path the Streamable-HTTP transport serves on (default /mcp).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_HTTP_PATH"
          },
          {
            "description": "Comma-separated allowlist of exact host:port values accepted by the Streamable-HTTP DNS-rebinding protection; empty defaults to loopback.",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS"
          },
          {
            "description": "Comma-separated allowlist of exact Origin values accepted by the Streamable-HTTP DNS-rebinding protection; empty defaults to loopback.",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS"
          },
          {
            "description": "Set to 1 to acknowledge TLS is terminated at the edge; required to bind the Streamable-HTTP transport to a non-loopback host.",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_HTTP_TLS_AT_EDGE"
          },
          {
            "description": "Set to 1 to acknowledge running the Streamable-HTTP transport without a token verifier; required to boot the HTTP transport while auth is off.",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_HTTP"
          },
          {
            "description": "Set to 1 to enable MCP authentication (the composite token verifier + Resource-Server wiring); off by default.",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_ENABLED"
          },
          {
            "description": "Comma-separated, ordered list of token-verifier strategies to compose (closed set: static, jwt, introspection, proxy, custom).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_STRATEGIES"
          },
          {
            "description": "OAuth authorization-server issuer URL advertised in the Protected-Resource Metadata (RFC 9728) when auth is enabled.",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_ISSUER_URL"
          },
          {
            "description": "The single resource identifier (RFC 8707 audience) for this server; the composite verifier re-checks every accepted token against it.",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_RESOURCE_SERVER_URL"
          },
          {
            "description": "Comma-separated scopes a caller must hold; the SDK returns 403 insufficient_scope when a principal lacks one.",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPES"
          },
          {
            "description": "Path to the JSON secrets file for the static-bearer verifier (stores only SHA-256 digests of the accepted tokens).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_STATIC_TOKENS_FILE"
          },
          {
            "description": "HTTPS JWKS endpoint the `jwt` verifier fetches signing keys from (an OIDC provider's .well-known/jwks.json).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_JWT_JWKS_URI"
          },
          {
            "description": "Expected `iss` claim for the `jwt` verifier; falls back to REBAR_MCP_AUTH_ISSUER_URL when unset.",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_JWT_ISSUER"
          },
          {
            "description": "Comma-separated PINNED, asymmetric-only JWS algorithms for the `jwt` verifier (default RS256,ES256); a symmetric algorithm on a JWKS source is refused.",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_JWT_ALGORITHMS"
          },
          {
            "description": "Clock-skew leeway in seconds applied to exp/nbf validation by the `jwt` verifier (default 60).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_JWT_LEEWAY"
          },
          {
            "description": "Minimum seconds between JWKS refetches triggered by an unknown key id (the concurrency-safe flood guard; default 30).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_JWT_JWKS_REFETCH_COOLDOWN"
          },
          {
            "description": "HTTP timeout in seconds for the `jwt` verifier's JWKS fetch (default 10).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_JWT_JWKS_TIMEOUT"
          },
          {
            "description": "When set, the `jwt` verifier requires the JWT header `typ` to equal this (e.g. at+JWT per RFC 9068); unset skips the check.",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_JWT_EXPECTED_TYP"
          },
          {
            "description": "Set to 1 to permit a private/link-local/loopback JWKS host (SSRF guard is on by default); off by default.",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_JWT_ALLOW_PRIVATE_JWKS_HOST"
          },
          {
            "description": "The `introspection` verifier's RFC 7662 endpoint URL (must be https://); the opaque token is POSTed here on every request (no caching).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_INTROSPECTION_ENDPOINT"
          },
          {
            "description": "The client id the `introspection` verifier presents to the Authorization Server via HTTP Basic (client_secret_basic).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_INTROSPECTION_CLIENT_ID"
          },
          {
            "description": "The NAME of the env var holding the introspection client secret (never the secret itself); must be present + non-empty at startup or the server refuses to start (fail-closed).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_INTROSPECTION_CLIENT_SECRET_ENV"
          },
          {
            "description": "Set to 1 to permit a private/link-local/loopback introspection endpoint host (SSRF guard is on by default); off by default.",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_INTROSPECTION_ALLOW_PRIVATE_HOST"
          },
          {
            "description": "Set to 1 to accept an active introspection response that OMITS `aud` (many AS do); off by default (fail-closed reject).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_INTROSPECTION_ALLOW_MISSING_AUD"
          },
          {
            "description": "The NAME of the env var holding the trusted-proxy shared secret (never the secret itself); must be present + non-empty at startup or the `proxy` verifier refuses to start (fail-closed).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_PROXY_SECRET_ENV"
          },
          {
            "description": "The header the fronting proxy sends its shared secret on; the identity is trusted only when this matches (constant-time; default x-proxy-auth).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_PROXY_SECRET_HEADER"
          },
          {
            "description": "The header carrying the proxy-authenticated principal identity, trusted only when the secret header validates (default x-forwarded-user).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_PROXY_IDENTITY_HEADER"
          },
          {
            "description": "Comma-separated fixed scope set granted to proxy-authenticated principals; empty by default (the principal holds no scopes).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_PROXY_SCOPES"
          },
          {
            "description": "The `custom` strategy's `module:factory` import string, resolving to a factory that returns a TokenVerifier; a TRUSTED operator config value that loads and executes the operator-configured code at startup (fail-closed on any load error).",
            "name": "REBAR_MCP_AUTH_CUSTOM_IMPORT"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "_meta": {
    "io.modelcontextprotocol.registry/official": {
      "status": "active",
      "statusChangedAt": "2026-08-16T00:28:17.196062Z",
      "publishedAt": "2026-08-16T00:28:17.196062Z",
      "updatedAt": "2026-08-16T00:28:17.196062Z",
      "isLatest": true
    }
  }
}
```

The server is listed as "rebar".